state regulation. In most instances, certification is voluntary and administered by private bodies-often competing for credibility and recognition-that depend on the support of firms. The authority of certification is broader but patchier than that of states and based on a logic of -one dollar, one vote‖ rather than the -one person, one vote‖ logic of democratic citizenship. There are numerous examples of certification systems that are lax in standards or weak in enforcement, as well as evidence that even the most credible programs often fail to significantly improve conditions -on the ground‖ (Seidman 2007) .
Still, calling certification a mode of regulation recognizes that it involves standards that are often precise and prescriptive, plus rationalized procedures for assessing compliance. Furthermore, certification initiatives' structures for setting standards, enforcing compliance, and adjudicating disputes have evolved to look strikingly similar to state and legal structures (Meidinger 2006) . In some countries and supply chains, certification systems have gained substantial, albeit partial, governing authority (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004 ), and at the transnational level, they have intertwined with state-based actors to generate hybrid fields of governance (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006) . To make sense of certification, one must consider broader trends in regulatory theory and practice, which have gone beyond the administrative procedures characterized (usually derisively) as -command and control.‖ This includes a number of experiments that use markets, information, deliberation, and -soft law‖ as regulatory tools (Schneiberg and Bartley 2008) .
Calls to make regulation -market-based‖ have motivated a variety of policy proposals, from the strengthening of property rights to -cap and trade.‖ Certification is market-based in that its power to affect behavior derives mainly from market demand.
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This may come from end consumers practicing -political consumerism‖ (Micheletti 2003) , but also from retailers promoting a particular brand image, procurement or licensing policies of institutional actors (e.g., governments, universities) (Seidman 2007), or socially responsible investors. In any case, the -price‖ of non-compliance is set by market forces, not by administrative authority. Certification does not embrace market mechanisms as fully as cap and trade, which uses markets not only to set the price of pollution but also to identify the most efficient ways for firms to improve their performance. Because certification initiatives set particular performance standards, they rely on market forces while also inserting alternative -conventions‖ (Renard 2003) or -orders of worth‖ (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) based in some non-market form of expertise or morality.
Certification also resonates with ideas about -regulation by information.‖ Scholars are increasingly investigating the effects of disclosure, reporting, and public rating, whether related to pollution (García, Afsah and Sterner 2009) , financial markets (Rona-Tas forthcoming), or universities (Espeland and Sauder 2006) . As Fung et al. (2007) point out, what information-based initiatives have in common is that the application of rewards and penalties is left to external audiences, which can include not just consumers, but also citizens and advocacy organizations. Viewing certification in this light suggests that its enforcement might happen not only within markets but through political and legal mobilization. Yet unlike programs that disclose relatively -raw‖ data or grade performance on some scale, certification typically reveals an aggregated, discrete judgment. And in contrast to mandatory disclosure initiatives, certification only generates -positive‖ information on firms that choose to participate and meet the 5 standards. For both of these reasons, certification is a very circumscribed form of regulation by information. If standards or auditing are especially lax, certification may even generate -disinformation‖ in the form of -greenwash‖ labeling.
Social and environmental certification initiatives are also types of voluntary programs-though unlike some, they include auditing and public recognition of compliance. As in all voluntary programs, whether publicly or privately run, firms must have some incentive to join, which creates a tension between stringency and participation (Potoski and Prakash 2009 ). Furthermore, since most certification programs are privately run (with the exception of government sponsored ecolabels), they face challenges of establishing authority while still garnering support from firms (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004) . Combined with the fact that participants can easily exit and develop their own standards (discussed later in this chapter), this sets up a complex politics of credibility (Boström 2006) .
Scholars sometimes refer to certification as -soft law.‖ Though certification lacks -hard‖ enforcement powers, calling it soft law is in many respects misleading. The core idea behind -soft‖ forms of governance is that behavior can be affected by stimulating informal social pressures, deliberation, and learning within the community of the regulated (Schneiberg and Bartley 2008) . Often, this means jettisoning -standards‖ in favor of guidelines and evolving systems for peer review and benchmarking. In contrast, certification systems tend to embrace standards and develop detailed indicators for auditing. In this sense, they depart from soft law's focus on dialogue among firms, though some certification associations might use collective deliberation to revise their standards over time.
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In sum, certification resonates with a range of ideas about how markets and information can be used as regulatory tools, as well as broader shifts toward voluntary programs and private governance. Yet ideas alone did not spawn certification, and its impacts may be far different than what advocates of regulatory innovations suggest. The next sections examine the history and ascendance of certification, as well as its evolution and potential consequences.
The rise of social and environmental certification
Social and environmental certification is not entirely new. Progressive-era activism over tenement sweatshops in the US led to the National Consumers' League -White Label,‖ which certified garments -made under clean and healthful conditions‖ from the 1890s to early 1920s (Sklar 1998) . This gave way to the -union label‖ promoted by American organized labor in the mid-20 th century (Frank 1999) . Consumer watchdogs that emerged in the 1920s-such as the forerunner to Consumer Reports-initially included labor standards in their ratings of products, though this later got sidelined by an -impartial testing‖ approach focused narrowly on quality (Rao 1998) . certification is a solution to information asymmetries and collective action problems, which arise via activist -naming and shaming‖ of firms as well as consumers' interest in -shopping with a conscience.‖ As activists put companies in the spotlight for exploiting workers or ecosystems, companies begin to make a variety of claims of social or environmental responsibility. Conscientious consumers may be interested in supporting responsible companies but find it difficult to assess the accuracy of their self-serving claims. Given this information problem, the market for responsible production is expected to fail unless credible systems of certification can be created to separate the -wheat from the chaff‖ (Akerlof 1970; Viscusi 1978) . For their part, companies face collective action problems that certification has the potential to solve. In particular, theorists of the -reputation commons problem‖ (King, Lenox and Barnett 2002) and similar accounts of reputation (Potoski and Prakash 2009) , argue that naming and shaming campaigns leave entire groups of companies -tarred by the same brush.‖ One way to address this problem is to construct external systems of certification. These can distinguish the good apples from the bad, provide -club benefits‖ to firms that contribute to an improved reputation, exclude free riders, and stabilize competition among leading firms (Potoski and Prakash 2009; Spar and Yoffie 2000) A second theoretical account views certification less as a solution to problems in the market and more as a political settlement and institution-building project (Bartley 2007b; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004) . Here, following Polanyi (1944) , markets are 9 seen as deeply embedded in social structures and unlikely to self-regulate effectively.
The pressures to re-embed markets in social relations that have typically generated state regulation are increasingly giving rise to private certification initiatives (Guthman 2007; Raynolds 2000) , as a result of political challenges being mobilized, channeled into particular arenas (i.e., markets), and crystallized into institutional arrangements. As social movements demand standards that can somehow regulate global supply chains, 
Competition and evolution
The evolution of social and environmental certification has been dynamic and contentious. As described above, many sectors feature multiple, competing initiatives.
Competition appears to be an inherent feature of private certification, since firms that are dissatisfied with one initiative can exit for a different program or start their own (Seidman 2007 Given the existence of competing programs, it would appear that certification would be plagued by a -race to the bottom,‖ leading to an overall decline in the stringency of standards. Yet at least two other trajectories are also possible. By some accounts, competition may breed a -ratcheting up‖ of standards, generated by credibility contests, or by learning and benchmarking in the world of certification (Sabel, O'Rourke and Fung 2000) . In addition, it is possible for multiple programs to co-exist (without one undermining another), especially if the markets they target are segmented.
The conditions under which competition breeds laxity, ratcheting up, or market segmentation are not yet clear. However, it is clear that in at least some circumstances, competition has not undermined relatively strong standards. In forestry, the FSC was able to fend off industry-based challenges in some regions (especially those with exportdependent forest products industries, weak industry associations, and high degrees of public involvement in forest policy) (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004) . Furthermore, public comparisons led industry-based programs to strengthen their standards over time 
Impacts of certification
Serious questions remain regarding the consequences of certification initiatives. Are their impacts, transformative, marginal, or non-existent? How are standards -on the books‖ put into practice? Might certification have unintended, perverse consequences?
The research literature is too undeveloped to offer full answers to these questions.
However, it is clear that the transformative power heralded by many champions of certification and political consumerism is both over-simplified and over-stated. Far from transcending socio-economic conflicts, power struggles, and governance failures, even the most credible certification program's operation is deeply influenced by configurations of power and interest at the local, national, and transnational levels. In one striking example, Ponte (2008) shows how MSC certification in South Africa was appropriated by white-owned fishing groups to maintain market control and exclude black-owned companies. This sort of finding reminds us that certification does not operate in a vacuum and may have wide range of effects, both intended and unintended.
The difficulties of assessing certification's impacts are partially methodological.
Identifying causal impacts poses serious data and research design challenges-including 14 accessing appropriate negative cases for comparison (i.e., uncertified firms) and problems of self-selection (i.e., better-performing firms choosing to get certified) (Hiscox, Schwartz and Toffel 2009) even though questions about causality and countervailing costs remain (Mutersbaugh 2005) . In many other instances, however, comparisons of certified and uncertified firms have found differences that are small or ambiguous (Agnew et al. 2006; Lima et al. 2009; Sharma, Sharma and Raj 2000) .
The difficulty of assessing certification's impact is also partly theoretical.
Scholars have often glossed over or conflated the variety of processes through which certification might shape the conditions of production. A closer look at five conceptually distinct but empirically overlapping -mechanisms of influence‖ can shed further light on the significance and limits of certification.
First, managers may improve particular production practices in order to get (or stay) certified. Studies of forest certification under the FSC, for instance, show that essentially all certified operations have been required by auditors to make some changes (Gullison 2003; Klooster 2006; Newsom, Bahn and Cashore 2006) . This may mean altering harvesting or conservation practices, though most commonly it means adopting managerial processes that may not necessarily translate into behavioral changes requirements (Nussbaum and Simula 2004) . Research on fisheries certification similarly finds that the changes required by auditors are numerous but only occasionally linked directly to discernable -on the water‖ outcomes (Agnew et al. 2006) .
Although much research assumes that spurring managerial improvement is the only way in which certification matters, this ignores several other potentially important processes. Even if it does not cause a change in behavior, certification may matter if it provides support for alternative production models (like cooperatives or communitybased organizations) or firms that are already -above the bar.‖ Fair Trade certification has boosted the incomes of coffee cooperatives (Bacon 2005; Jaffee 2007) , and forest certification has sometimes helped community forestry operations improve access to markets and financing (Klooster 2006; Nebel et al. 2005) . Furthermore, this support may generate demonstration effects in which alternative practices spill over from certified to conventional farms-as has happened with some organic farming methods (Jaffee 2007) .
Third, certification could conceivably shape dispersed decisions about investment or land use. For instance, supporters of forest certification have often hoped that by building markets for certified forest products, they could reduce the incentives for largescale clearing of forests for conversion to agriculture (Johnson and Cabarle 1993) . In theory, if certification adds value to socially just or environmentally friendly practices, this could reduce the relative profitability of the most exploitative practices. Yet there is 16 little evidence that this hypothesized influence has actually occurred. Whatever premiums exist for certified products appear far too small to significantly reduce the incentives for exploitative investment and land use. Forest certification has rewarded firms that are already managing forest land for wood and paper production, but the reward has proven far too small to discourage others from converting forests to plantations or cattle pasture (Gullison 2003) . Neither does sustainable fisheries certification appear to have altered the fundamental calculus of the industry, as yields and ocean biodiversity have continued to decline (Worm et al. 2006) . The ability of certification to alter the logic of resource exploitation throughout a sector appears to be quite limited at the current time.
A fourth mechanism of influence comes through certification's interaction with social movements and transnational activism. Like other transnational standards, certification may provide a platform for challengers to expose exploitative practices or mobilize global forces to rectify local injustice. Under some conditions, activists may be able to leverage certification to force changes that companies would otherwise resist.
Labor rights activists have occasionally leveraged transnational standards to gain recognition of insurgent unions, although this strategy has only rarely been successful (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005) . Engagement with certification may also carry dangers of co-optation and de-radicalization (Hughes 2007; Seidman 2007 ). More research is needed to assess the conditions under which social movement leveraging of certification can bring about significant changes.
Finally, certification may shape the conditions of production by influencing public authority and government regulation. The direction of this influence is the subject of much debate. Some scholars worry that even if certification spurs marginal improvements, its net effect may be negative if it crowds out more powerful interventions, like the strengthening of state capacities and citizenship rights. Seidman (2007) argues that Rugmark certification has deflected attention from the Indian state's complicity in child labor and from more promising strategies for reducing it.
Vandergeest (2007) suggests that effective local regulation of shrimp aquaculture in
Thailand is being crowded out-or at least ignored by-sustainable shrimp certification initiatives. On the other hand, some scholars see certification and government regulation as complementary. Some work suggests that the expansion of private auditing may allow government agencies to focus their limited resources on other parts of the market, thus generating a kind of -uncoordinated complementarity‖ (Amengual forthcoming). In other cases, government regulation may explicitly endorse certification or provide regulatory relief to certified operations, as has happened with forestry law in several countries (Nebel et al. 2005; Pattberg 2006 ). Another account of complementarity suggests that firms that have been certified to high standards may participate in -Baptistbootlegger‖ coalitions that lobby for increased regulatory stringency (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Vogel 2005) . Much work remains to be done to understand how certification and governments complement or contradict one another, especially at the point of production in developing countries.
Overall, the ascendance of certification as a mode of regulation-especially for transnational supply chains-has opened up a variety of questions for scholars of regulation. This chapter has sought to guide scholars interested in further developing this literature and for citizens and policymakers interested in understanding the character and
